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Chapter 7 
Nature, Nurture and Nietzsche's Faith in 
Life 
Nalin Ranasinghe 
Nietzsche's earliest published works are also his clearest. They reveal an intense 
struggle between pessimistic presuppositions and life-affirming aspirations. 
Since this paradoxical opposition extends throughout Nietzsche's philosophical 
career, thoughtful consideration of its origin may shed light on some of his be-
wildering later writings. Using close readings of The Birth of Tragedy (BT) and 
the second Untimely Meditation: On the Advantages and Disadvantages of His-
tory for Life (UM2) I will show how and why Nietzsche goes back to Classical 
Greece seeking a pessimism of strength adequate to the dire threat posed by the 
Death of God. 1 This event, famously proclaimed by Nietzsche, 2 came about 
through the triumphs of science and democracy. Yet the herald of these lusty 
tidings was himself deeply troubled by the cultural and moral chaos that he saw 
following the consequent unopposed rise of egalitarianism and collapse of hie-
rarchy; he tried hard to combat and forestall nihilistic developments that would 
lead to the Death of Man. 
Nietzsche was convinced that without religious or aristocratic power to curb 
them, the hubris of vulgar democratizing forces would bring about the suicide of 
humanity itself. Although recent events may well have justified these fears, his 
deeply misanthropic assumptions poisoned his own noble attempts to rescue 
high culture from vulgar demotic civilization. These views also led him to de-
velop a philosophy of history that legitimized untruth, prejudice and violence. 
At the level of practice, his underlying pessimism caused Nietzsche to endorse a 
political regime that uncannily reproduced the tripartite structure, noble lies and 
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cynical psychology of Plato's draconian Republic. Sadly, this fusion of radically 
Modem means-symptomatic of the very decadence Nietzsche sought to fores-
tall-and lofty Classical ends helped set in motion a cult of power that first 
caused two World Wars and then, over-reacting to itself, engendered a virulently 
resentful anti-humanism that has mortally wounded both the nation state and the 
academy-spawning an incontinent generation of de-politicized consumers who 
live as post-natural slaves. 
The first two parts of this chapter will study Nietzsche's earliest writings. 
Here he is most confident about his project and accordingly, quite explicit about 
its bleak ontological assumptions. In his later most famous writings, Nietzsche 
chooses to be poetic rather than philosophical; he nevertheless signals fairly 
clearly that this change in idiom has to do with his loss of faith in the capacity of 
his own generation to bear the great spiritual burdens demanded by the Death of 
God. Accordingly, as the gap between the spiritual haves and have-nots of the 
world widened dramatically, he came to believe that his generation's moral de-
cadence had to be accelerated. Thus, the few who still knew the meaning of no-
bility would see the need to direct humanity towards an elitist culture of life-
affirmation and away from the ruins of post-Christian egalitarianism. He feared 
that since his own age was already poorly prepared for the brutal demands made 
by life, the future could leave the human spirit permanently impotent. Even 
though he did not really believe with his sometime disciple Heidegger that any-
thing truly noble would survive the storm of nihilism,3 Nietzsche hoped that the 
mighty Dionysian energies unleashed by immediate cultural chaos would be 
sufficient for the philosophers of the future to rebuild European culture accord-
ing to his specifications. 
PART I: THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY 
In his first book, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche prophetically called for the 
recovery of the daimon of tragedy to exorcize the specter of nihilism haunting 
the doomed European civilization of his day. Soon after Bismarck had trium-
phantly proclaimed the German Reich as the successor to the Holy Roman Em-
pire,4 a young philologist sternly warned his hubristic fatherland that it had no 
right to place itself at the pinnacle of European Culture. Nietzsche scandalized 
the Hellenists and educators of his day by scornfully ridiculing their belief that 
Athenian culture, celebrated by Pericles as the School of Hellas, was all sweet-
ness and light: a harmonious blend of logic, oratory, mathematics, music and 
architecture. Instead, he contended that these shining Apollonian achievements 
arose out of a dark and unblinking realism about the objective value of human 
life. 5 Nietzsche claimed that European civilization, just like that of Athens, 
would be overthrown by its own hubris and optimism if it ignored the more dan-
gerous roots of culture. He warned that the regnant democratic values of equali-
ty and freedom, coupled with an arrogant belief in the powers of reason and the 
pursuit of effortless pleasure, would produce dissipation, decadence and calami-
ty. Correctly seeing that man could not live by bread (and circuses) alone with-
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'~ out nihilism ensuing, he sought to create new modes of spiritual authority and 
~. political order. 
,,' Nietzsche's early views were much influenced by Schopenhauer's assertion 
':. that the primal entity at the heart of reality is a blind unconscious Will to Life. 
All things are illusions, short-lived dreams generated by the Will as it strives 
endlessly to perpetuate its darkly irrational existence. 6 While Schopenhauer's 
1
: mood is one of Buddhist resignation towards human bondage to the passions, 
Nietzsche seeks to articulate the tenets of a so-called pessimism of strength. 7 He 
' will try to educate a few good men who would drain this bitter cup of truth with 
him, whilst praising life and promoting tragic virtue. 
Nietzsche claimed that Greek tragedy was a higher synthesis of the two 
very different ways of coping with the harsh realities and cruel necessities of 
human life. Sophocles seems to have anticipated Schopenhauer's insight into the 
human condition in words he attributed to Silenus: "O wretched ephemeral race 
. . . what is best for you is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born . . . but the 
second best is for you to die soon" (Oedipus at Co/onus 1224.ff.)8• Mortals natu-
rally have two ways of evading awareness of their unfortunate state of embodied 
individuality: they can either take refuge in Apollo through otherworldly dreams 
and delusive illusions,9 or they could temporarily extinguish their consciousness 
entirely and lose themselves in an ecstatic celebration of Dionysian intoxication 
and excess. 10 Of course this suggests, contra Socrates, that the examined life is 
emphatically not worth living; even though it is said to be our highest and most 
divine faculty, rationality is truly the greatest source of misery and torment to 
our species. 
Yet Nietzsche tells us that the invention of tragedy, which we must recall 
served as both a cultural and religious institution, made it possible for the Athe-
nians to live in a manner that consciously celebrated the highest possibilities of 
both man and life itself. This means that philosophy, which strives optimistically 
to discover a veiled truth that could only blind and nauseate it, had to be subor-
dinated to the muse of poetry. Nietzsche himself decisively resolves the dispute 
between the poets and the philosophers in favor of the former party. In 
Nietzsche's own words BT took on the problem of science, 11 which caused ni-
hilism when it was left to its own devices and treated as an end in itself. Science 
had to be viewed by art, and art had to serve the interests of life 12 if mankind 
was not to be overwhelmed by pessimism and decadence. Nietzsche suggests 
that the period of Greek decadence began when sophisticated rationalism, de-
mocracy and prosperity corrupted the Athenians, who had in their virtuous past 
been inspired by the divine madness of Dionysus to staunchly affirm life in all 
of its bittersweet fullness. 
Tragedy, which literally means "trag-odes" or "goat-song" may be seen as 
the belatedly enlightened swan song of a sacrificial victim or scapegoat who 
sees his life flash before him and celebrates its completeness. This inspired insti-
tution made it possible for the demos of a Greek polity to recover oneness and 
gain wisdom as they studied the life and passion of Dionysus, literally god-son 
or son of God, through the sublime veil of music. The tragic hero, whether Oe-
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dipus, Orestes, or Heracles, was an incarnation of Dionysus-the bastard son of 
Zeus-who painfully gains human recognition of his divinity, only to be tom to 
shreds by his frenzied followers at this moment of apotheosis as they seek to 
possess and consume his body and blood. While Dionysus does perform see-
mingly divine miracles, his mortal part ensures that these are short-lived13-
albeit glorious. Gods live and die so that life may continue to have meaning for 
mankind. 
This re-enactment of the famous choice of Achilles would also give sober 
understanding and a measure of comfort to those condemned by the grim neces-
sities of poverty and nature to expect nothing more than a life of changeless ob-
scurity. Whilst admiring the beauty of heroic striving, when presented with the 
inevitable results of hubris and excess they learn not to envy the great in their 
temporary exaltation. There is suddenly not so much distance between lives of 
short-lived glory and bitter obscurity; indeed the hero gains immortality in the 
memories of those many who continually find enlightenment in contemplating 
his agon. Nietzsche's main point is that mortal life can only be justified as an 
aesthetic experience; it can never give us lasting happiness or moral justifica-
tion. He condemns both Christianity and Science for their optimism: the one 
speaks of a loving personal God and the other promises impossible happiness in 
this life-which offers no final solutions. In other words, strange gods are wor-
shipped and the youth are corrupted. 
Nietzsche harshly criticizes Euripides and Socrates for fatally undermining 
Athens by invoking moral criteria in aesthetic/religious matters and demanding 
that the tragic regime justify itself rationally. By making the rational individu-
al-not the extended satyr chorus of tragedy-the measure of meaning, these 
two decadent intellectuals destroyed the unity of the polis and tore apart the 
veils of Maya that protected humanity from the naked ugliness of Fortuna. 
While Nietzsche ironically suggests that Euripides is both a thinker and a poet, 14 
he reserves his shrillest criticism for Socrates who equated beauty with logical 
intelligibility, not appreciating that beauty replaced intelligibility as the only 
means of grasping the living truth about reality. Nietzsche ironically quotes So-
crates' famous statement that Anaxagoras with his Nous seemed like a sober 
man amidst a throng of drunken revelers. 15 But this meant that, like Euripides, 
Socrates refused to understand the Dionysian theodicy. He knew nothing and 
took pride in his ignorance; but this only meant that, since his instincts were 
unhealthy and ignoble, he could not know the heightened awareness of the ecs-
tatic bacchante. His daimon was a negative principle. 
Nietzsche's brief history of the West is completed when we look to his later 
works. Under the influence of the rationalistic criticism of Euripides and So-
crates, along with the forces of hubris and democratization that both caused and 
were accelerated by the Peloponnesian War, the tragic culture of Athens buckled 
and died. It was replaced by an Alexandrian regime of scientific rationality that 
was transplanted through the world conquered by the Macedonian empire. Even 
though the Hellenistic age was soon replaced by a thousand years of Roman 
Christianity, which renewed and deepened the Socratic opposition of life and 
Nature, Nurture and Nietzsche's Faith in Life 97 
morality by dismissing the Earth as a vale of tears and looking to an afterworld 
for truth and justice, the Reformation soon revived the Alexandrian project. The 
Reformers spawned a moralistic and technological culture that after strangling 
the promising aesthetic revival begun by Renaissance humanism then caused 
God's death and religion's redundancy by creating a democratic empire of cul-
tural Philistinism. Democracy and technology are closely related because the 
Christian belief in a God who loves all equally regardless of deserts, thus leav-
ing all men equal after the Death of God, is compatible with a world where ad-
miration at the heroic deeds of exceptional individuals is replaced by lazy faith, 
greedy hope and undeserved charity-vices based on the anonymous and inhu-
mane generosity of science. 
Although BT concludes with an embarrassing panegyric to Richard Wagn-
er, Nietzsche offers little explanation as to how the Bard of Bayreuth would re-
store tragedy and redeem humanity from cultural philistinism. One of the chief 
weaknesses of this work is its exaggerated belief in the power of music to bring 
about a political revolution. Even if tragedy was the cultural cement of Athens, 
the sheer size of the modem state militates against its playing this role in his 
time or ours; vulgar nationalism or violent fascism would be more likely to be 
spawned in the modem era. Though his next work on this theme does not refer 
to Wagner or Socrates, Nietzsche is far more explicit about the political and his-
torical categories informing his thoughts. 
PART II: THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY 
While his first Untimely Meditation directly discussed the problems posed by 
the non-event of the Death of God and deplored the smug culture of historical 
optimism and cultural philistinism that pervaded the Second Reich, it is only in 
UM2 that Nietzsche develops a philosophy of cyclical history for the post-
Christian epoch. Yet, although this essay into history is brilliantly insightful and 
strikingly original, it has many classical antecedents that Nietzsche is careful not 
to mention. The solution to the problem of history posited in this work is struc-
turally similar to that put forward in BT; in both instances he offers three possi-
ble solutions to the problem of decadence; they include a higher synthesis that 
prudently incorporates the strengths of the other two positions. 
UM2 begins by warning of the risk of a culture being overwhelmed by an 
indigestible glut of historical data. Reprising Silenus' warning to the curious, 
Nietzsche argues that the uneducated must not be exposed to the heartbreaking 
cruelty and meaningless chaos of the totality of human history; seeing that life is 
devoid of meaning or value, the best fall victim to apathetic relativism and the 
worst embrace violent barbarism. As we cannot all be a-historical, like cattle 
living in the eternal now, Nietzsche argues that history must be formed and 
made conducive to life. "And this is the universal law; a living thing can only be 
healthy, strong, and fruitful when bounded by a horizon." 16 This is "the basis for 
cheerfulness, a good conscience, a joyful deed and confidence in the future. All 
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of them depend, in the case of an individual as of a nation, on the existence of a 
line dividing the bright and knowable from the dark and obscure." 17 
Like the Sabbath, history was made for man; it must serve life and cannot 
judge it. In the language of BT history needs a muse, a Wagner. His art provides 
the players with a master plot and historical horizon in which they will act. In 
tum, these actions give their non-critical spectators a sense of spiritual gravity 
and source of meaning. In UM2 Nietzsche identifies three different kinds of 
history: Monumental, Antiquarian, and Critical. They are described respectively 
as being appropriate to those who (a) act and strive, (b) preserve and revere, and 
(c) suffer and seek deliverance. 18 While this regime could very easily be viewed 
in traditional mediaeval terms, as being composed of nobles, clergy and peasants 
respectively, things are not as simple as they seem. 
Monumental history is created for those worthies who restlessly strut and 
fret about the world-historical stage. Nietzsche describes them as those who de-
sire immortal fame and tum to history; they must believe in the continued possi-
bility of greatness--even if this is gained through falsely imposing past prece-
dents on a different present, "monumental history deceives by analogies," 19 and 
only result in barbarism and genocide. Seeking to literally emulate the feats of 
past heroes, and valuing glory above life, they are eternally opposed to those of 
the common herd who seek to live at any cost and refuse to believe that the vio-
lent young bravos of the present could ever match the deeds of their godlike 
ancestors. Those hoi po/loi who "preserve and revere" whilst believing in provi-
dence and historical necessity, are the true consumers of Antiquarian history. 
They are the backward looking chorus of believers and kneeling camels on 
whose bowed backs the drama of history is staged for the future. Both types 
need each other; pious Antiquarian history gives heroism an afterlife by sancti-
fying the violent deeds and forgetting the brutal times of the Monumental glory-
hounds. 
The bearers of Antiquarian remember the past but are themselves forgotten, 
while the heroes of Monumental history must forget much to be remembered. 
Heroes cannot afford to recall "the essential condition of all happenings, this 
blindness and injustice in the soul of him who acts." The hero is as single-
minded as a mother nursing her child: "He who acts loves his deed infinitely 
more than it deserves." Zarathustra says that he "makes his virtue his addiction 
and his catastrophe: for his virtue's sake he wants to live on and live no longer. 
(He) does not want to have too many virtues. One virtue is better than two-it is 
more of a noose on which his catastrophe may hang. "20 Yet, these nooses are 
woven together by the Nous of a Critical historian who turns out to be a real 
maker of history-whilst not being counted among its heroes. While we know 
far more about Achilles than we do about Homer, it is yet legitimate to ask ifthe 
choreographer is greater than his dunce-like dancer. Also, would the original 
Achilles recognize himself in the Iliad? ls it better to be known or renowned? 
Nietzsche would have us see poets like Homer, Plato, Shakespeare, and himself 
as invisible and uncrowned makers (poietes) of human nature. 
, 
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Achilles and Alexander are good examples of the profane material that his-
tory is made from. For all we know Achilles, who lived 400 years before Hom-
er, was a brutal young thug-a Greek Billy the Kid-whose life was magically 
transmuted into an eternal symbol of doomed mortality by the poet's genius. 
Critical reading of the Homeric epics reveals ample evidence to support the view 
that these works actually warn mankind against ever repeating the violent folly 
of their ancestors, deeds that plunged Greece into many centuries of darkness. 
Still, 400 years after Homer, a "monumental" reading of his poems would lead 
another young thuggish military genius, Alexander, to destroy Greek liberty 
forever whilst seeking to emulate Achilles and conquer the entire world. 
It is clear that neither the lions of Monumental history nor the camels of 
Antiquarian history are capable of seeing the naked truth: the empty randomness 
and ugly necessities governing human events. It takes an exceptional person to 
unblinkingly observe these phenomena; blind Homer and exiled Thucydides 
come to mind, and their understanding is often accompanied by an inability to 
exercise power in their own name and time. Yet they can train the historical ac-
tors of the future whilst also providing less discerning and fearful mortals com-
forting shadows to light their way to justly obscure graves. They hope that this 
"new stem discipline" of critical history will "implant in us a second nature so 
that our first nature withers away" in "an attempt to give our-selves a posteriori 
a past in which one would like to originate in opposition to that in which one 
did."21 
There is much that is violent about Critical history. "If he is to live, man 
must possess and from time to time employ the strength to break up and dis-
solve. "22 Blindly oblivious to justice, it sees that every past "is worthy to be 
condemned for that is the nature of human things . . . violence and weakness 
have always played a mighty role in them." 23 Yet this violence is in the service 
of Life "that dark driving power that insatiably thirsts for itself' and passes 
judgment "its sentence is always unmerciful, always unjust ... For all that exists 
is worthy of perishing ... to live and to be unjust is one and the same thing."24 
Nietzsche reminds us that historical justice can only be vindicated by Eosterity: 
"only he who constructs the future has the right to judge the past." 5 We are 
warned not to seek the appearance of justice if we are called to the dreadful vo-
cation of being a just man. 26 It seems that these critical historians are trying to 
follow and imitate Schopenhauer's Will to Live. 
Still, Critical historians who "suffer and seek deliverance" cannot gain any-
thing like salvation in the ontology described by Nietzsche. They merely find 
transcendence from the nauseating spectacle of human delusion and impotence 
by continually weaving the shining Apollonian illusions that protect the many 
from the naked Dionysian truth about themselves. This royal art of weaving is 
used as an image of true statesmanship in Plato's eponymous dialogue; the ruler 
has to spin together the spirited and moderate elements of the citizenry so that 
his polity endures. 27 The tragic poet plays the same role in uniting historical ac-
tors and spectators to praise Dionysus, the god of chaos, while keeping him safe-
ly beyond the city walls. Likewise, the Critical historian's esoteric art ensures 
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that the Monumental and Antiquarian narratives stay safely within the horizons 
defined by their respective powers to bear truth and sustain the endless relay 
race of life. 28 
INTERLUDE: BACK TO THE FUTURE? 
The tripartite account of history that Nietzsche has set forth here must be seen to 
correspond to a much older account of human types originally articulated by a 
poet who lived at about the same time as Homer. In his Works and Days Hesiod 
divided mankind up into those who could see, those who could learn to see, and 
those who were incapable of seeing. In talcing about sight, he is referring to the 
"mathema" the knowable things. This corresponds in a way to the word "idea" 
which in its non-technical original sense meant the "look" of a thing. Hesiod 
distinguishes between (a) those rare seers who are not blinded by ignorance and 
passion, (b) the few, who learn to see and live by learning from those who know 
and ( c) the incorrigibles who will never learn to see or live properly. 29 
Nietzsche is less hopeful since, as we know, he believes that only very few 
can or should look into the heart of darkness and see reality as it is. His three 
types of history are, as we have seen intended for (a) the hidden creators of ar-
tificial truth, (b) those few who learn to act on the tragic-historical stage created 
by the creators, and (c) the herd-like masses capable only of mindless and su-
perstitious lives. We note that even the first class will avert their eyes from 
primal reality and instead contemplate the intermediary Apollonian world of 
their creation. In other words, the three types must co-exist collectively. 
There is also an even more significant intellectual antecedent to this tripar-
tite regime. Although Nietzsche vigorously attacks Socrates and Plato in the 
name of pre-philosophic tragic pessimism, his own solution to the problems of 
progressive philistinism ultimately amounts to a flatfootedly literal recreation of 
the draconian regime, which I interpret as satirically depicted in Plato's Repub-
lic. His three kinds of history exactly correspond to the three soul types: Intellec-
tual Guardians, Heroic Warriors and Herd-like Workers. All of them held in a 
cave by different relationships towards commonly held noble fictions. While the 
perfectly just city of the Republic is fated to self-destruct, and can be shown to 
be a reductio-ad-absurdum of tyranny and utopian authoritarianism, the several 
historical lies that Nietzsche deploys here are intended to be the basis of an ac-
tual polity. While Plato's Republic mutedly tries to show that the soul rather 
than the city is the true bearer of virtue, 30 Nietzsche has so little trust in the 
soul's power to be virtuous that he places his trust in the outcome of a process 
ruled by chance, fraud and violence. Thus, ten years later, in the persona of Zar-
athustra, a Nietzsche grown old and wise urged a generation of free spirits to 
sacrifice themselves for the future. 31 While religious German soldiers going to 
the Great War were given a Bible to take with them, the irreligious could choose 
Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra as alternative reading for the trenches. 32 
In BT and UM2, Nietzsche hoped that Wagner and he would jointly create 
the ruling mythology for the Post-Christian age. These wishful dreams were 
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finally dashed at Bayreuth 1876 when Wagner revealed himself to be merely 
another Romantic seeking redemption.33 This meant that, since Nietzsche soon 
despaired of finding the spirited or Monumental class that would follow him, he 
bad to turn directly to the rabble. Just as laconic Socrates had to learn music, 
Nietzsche had to become the mouthpiece of Dionysus. Like Moses, he saw that 
he had to lead a small band of free spirits out of the equivalent of the Fleshpots 
of Egypt: the vulgar optimism of Imperial Germany. As this quest for "free spi-
rits" proved fruitless, Nietzsche realized that he had to look beyond his own 
time; like Moses he had to unleash plagues on the present, advance the collapse 
of modem civilization, and brew all of Europe a deadly brew of anarchic vi-
olence. He also had to become reconciled to not entering his Promised Land as 
its philosopher king. No longer the guide and master of his own exodus, he had 
to become a sacrifice and bridge for the over-man. Just as Dionysus is doomed 
to perish at his moment of apotheosis, Nietzsche must "go under" and take a 
generation down with him if his hopes are to stand any chance of success. This 
is why the sometime prophet of Dionysus self-consciously calls himself "the 
crucified one."34 Instead of living as wise sage, he had to perish gloriously as a 
misunderstood god. 
PART Ill: ZARATHUSTRA AND HIS PROGENY 
This is also why, while Nietzsche's earliest writings were relatively easy to un-
derstand but hard to follow, his last works are as enticingly easy to follow as 
their ultimate purpose or end is obscure. Since "Zarathustra's Prologue" is rich 
in symbolism, and contains the essence of Nietzsche's movement from tragedy 
to comedy, I will decipher some of its pregnant and suggestive images that give 
provide the key to his masterpiece. 
In this prologue to Zarathustra, ominously titled "a book for everyone and 
no-one" Nietzsche, who earlier described himself as a kind of Prometheus fig-
ure, carrying his ashes up to his mountain35 -presumably because his fire had 
been refused-now decides to return to humankind. 36 Ten years have lapsed 
since his last abortive donation, a period roughly corresponding to the years 
1873-1883: the time separating UM2 from the first part of Zarathustra. The sage 
now bears all of mankind a gift, whilst conceding to a retired hermit that he too 
no longer loves man. 37 The classical reference suggests that Promethean fire, 
representing enlightenment for those few with forethought, will soon be re-
placed by Pandora-literally all-giving or giving to "all." This donation is made 
to the demotic many who must be compelled to become free spirits. Seeing that 
his gift, the neglected cave-fire of tragedy, is going out, Prometheus turns arson-
ist38. The "all" of the rabble receive a bright shiny gift, albeit one they neither 
appreciate nor understand. This Pandemic firebrand will drive them from their 
decadent cave-like civilization, out into reality. However their ultimate destina-
tion is not revealed. 
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When Zarathustra enters a town, and meets a crowd assembled to watch a 
tightrope walker, for entertainment now rules public space, he uses the opportu-
nity to preach the over-man. Claiming that man (like all the other beasts) must 
evolve towards something better, he warns that man at present is "more ape than 
any ape."39 What is truly human? The sage claims that the over-man shall be 
"the meaning of the earth."40 By this he means one who justifies life, not point-
ing to any otherworldly reward or kingdom, but by living well in the fullness of 
reality. He fears that post-religious man will regress to become a crassly hedo-
nistic animal -one whose selfishness will betray both the earth and the long 
struggle of life that gave birth to consciousness and reason. While Zarathustra is 
very critical of religious men who tormented the body, he has scathing words for 
those who indulge the flesh and leave their souls poor, filthy and wretched.41 
This endless tug of war between body and soul cannot be the meaning of life. 
Rather, the great powers latent in human nature, the unity of the human mind 
and the bounty of nature, must be actualized to celebrate life. Zarathustra scolds 
those who too niggardly in exercising their virtues. 42 
This raises the interesting question whether it is nobler to dedicate oneself 
to destroying the forces of negation that stifle the souls of others, or to living as 
good and exemplary a life as possible. We have seen much to suggest that 
Nietzsche would combine the two but stress the former; a career devoted to the 
tearing down of idols would be just the kind of brief glorious life that Greek 
tragedy praised; furthermore, UM2 with its emphasis on the artificiality of cul-
ture does not stray very far from the wisdom of Schopenhauer and Sophocles on 
the transcendent value of existence; life is cruel and there is nothing beyond the 
body, shadows and cave. 
The crowd had hitherto taken Zarathustra's words as praise for the tightrope 
walker who begins his doomed act as the sage continues to extol selflessly he-
roic sacrificial virtue. He warmly proclaims his love for those who squander 
their souls, and make their virtue an addiction and catastrophe; he blesses those 
who justify the future and redeem the past by their wish to perish of the 
present.43 When Zarathustra finally realizes that he is not understood, he appeals 
to his audience's shame by describing the last man and his victimless crime: the 
invention of the art of vicarious happiness. 44 But even this shift to negative rhe-
toric does not work as he expected. 
Zarathustra's last man no longer has "whirling chaos" in himself and can't 
give birth to a "dancing star": moreover, he will not despise himself for this im-
potence. To him, human categories like love, creation and longing have no 
meaning; everything is small and he makes everything small. This man's race is 
ineradicable and he lives longest. Priding himself on his invention of happiness, 
the last man practices neighborly love out of prudence; he blinks continually 
because he can't concentrate on anything for too long; 45 his sleep is drugged and 
his health is his religion; he only works because it is diverting and nothing is 
worth serious attention. Leading and following require too much effort for the 
last man who merely desires to feel what everyone feels; to him we are all the 
same.46 
Nature, Nurture and Nietzsche's Faith in Life 103 
Zarathustra is amazed to find that his dark prophecy meets with wild enthu-
siasm. "Give us the last man," the crowd cries like those who once said: "Give 
us Barabbas!'.47 "Tum us into these last men, Then we shall make you a gift of 
the over man."48 Following this total breakdown in communication, a dejected 
Zarathustra is left alone with the broken body of the fallen tightrope walker to 
ponder the dismissive vulgarity of the urban crowd. 
This desire for the last man meant that Zarathustra' s greatest fear had all but 
materialized; strikingly, the crowd's comic optimism is more nauseating to the 
seer than the violence of history; like the tightrope walker, he too has plunged 
into the abyss of despair.49 Having starved their souls by first denying the stem 
classical virtues, and then losing faith in an afterlife where sentimental virtue 
would prevail over superb vice, the rabble were quite prepared to renounce their 
souls (along with their human heritage of reason, conscience and freedom) in 
exchange for a drugged dream of mindless comfort and endless entertainment. 
God's death had become a cliche to the last man's shameless parents who knew 
themselves only as pleasure centers. Godless Zarathustra could no longer shock 
them: God had been made redundant by the triumphs of science and democracy. 
But this only meant that (just as Christian rulers took over the Roman Empire 
instead of ending it) the rabble would delegate the powers of God to a democrat-
ic over-manager. He would have a popular mandate to rule as a good shepherd 
over tame beasts. 
It is quite clear that such a regime would be inherently unstable; human na-
ture being what it is, any ruler would surely be corrupted-if not by his own 
vices then surely by the attenuated attention spans and hedonistic foci of his 
subjects. 50 These "penultimate men" would be led by their desires and have mi-
nimal sense of a common good. As Nietzsche brilliantly observed in his Twilight 
of the Idols, once we abolish the "real world" of the idealists, the apparent world 
is also swept away in the flood of becoming. 51 It would seem that rank, order 
and rule could only be re-established in such a narcissistic society after a rude 
interregnum of anarchy that would reacquaint the populace with the ugliness of 
reality and destroy all of the optimistic assumptions that advanced cultural deca-
dence. 
Yet, since we know that Nietzsche also believes in the artificiality of cul-
ture, he cannot afford to believe that Apollo will restore what Dionysus has not 
destroyed. While he did not anticipate the invention of nuclear weapons that 
could destroy the planet or foresee the insidious risk of environmental degrada-
tion, his instinct in this matter was sound. A weakened culture must first be de-
stroyed and then rebuilt or restored as soon as possible, if necessary by hasten-
ing the very forces of decadence that "push down what is falling." 52 Nietzsche 
enters the prologue as a Jester who makes the tightrope walker, also a symbol of 
the old morality of two worlds, fall to his death making way for a violent new 
order.53 
This is why Zarathustra, at the end of his prologue, leaves the dead to bury 
the dead. 54 He now seeks living disci~les but even these unidentified men are 
urged to lose him and find themselves. 5 Earlier, he begged them to remain faith-
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ful to the earth;56 they were to give life a new human meaning by recovering the 
virtues exiled by otherworldliness. These rehabilitated virtues are violent and 
destructive. Zarathustra's disciples had to restore the heroic qualities lost when 
the "penultimate men" invented happiness by abolishing or forgetting the quin-
tessentially human qualities of love, courage and honor in the name of pusilla-
nimous prudence and passive-aggressive piety. The hour for Monumental histo-
ry had come. The stubbornly held Antiquarian history of the pious slaves would 
otherwise implode. This cultural collapse occurs as they await the coming of a 
redeeming over-man; He establishes the era of the last man, the Son of Man, a 
Kingdom that lasts forever. 
In Zarathustra's account of the three metamorphoses of spirit, he tells of 
three stages of history that must come to pass. 57 These stages correspond to the 
tripartite schema of UM2, albeit in a diachronic (not synchronic) way. The first 
stage, the Camel, is the era of Antiquarian history; the Camel is like the 
tightrope walker we met, with a broken back. It may be seen as human being-
for-itself seeking being-in-itself by its passive refusal of freedom. Invulnerable 
only in the heel, it must humbly bear every burden of faith, and struggle through 
the swirling sands of history, until it turns into a Lion. The Camel fears anarchy 
and bears new laws well, giving them time to become instinct and second na-
ture. But when laws are tired and irrelevant, the last man rides in on its stiff-
necked reverence. 
The stage of the Lion is the transformation that Zarathustra must steel him-
self to bring about; in other words, like Moses, his eyes are not destined to wit-
ness the culmination of the entire process. The Lion's task is to denounce and 
destroy all that is false, old and morally coercive. He must find and destroy the 
old Dragon that enslaved the camel-like spirit for many thousands of years. The 
Dragon of tradition enslaved the spirit with the words "thou shalt."58 This Dra-
gon, representing all created value, jealously guards the treasure of human free-
dom. The Lion cannot create values, but it must deliver the spirit from enslave-
ment by roaring out its sacred ''NO." The Lion must find vanity, illusion and 
caprice in even the most sacred things so that the spirit may be liberated from 
the burden of sin and slavery. Though the Lion frees the spirit from ancient 
loves and dead duties, this spirit is yet a purely destructive force. Its transforma-
tion into the glorious form of Monumental history may only occur when the 
Lion is given new horizons that will explain and glorify its great acts of destruc-
tion. This blond beast needs these pellucid justifications to cleanse and purify its 
deeds; only these purposes and reasons will give beauty and nobility to a gory 
narrative that would otherwise depict little more than prideful sound and venge-
ful fury. 
Only Apollo can give subsequent grace and healing beauty to a chaotic 
Bacchanal-an orgy of the spirit that must surely be incapable of being beheld 
by a sober witness. Here we see the third Critical stage of history: the Child. 
One is reminded of Heraclitus saying that "kingship belonfcs to a child"59 but 
more suggestive is the lyre playing David who slew a Lion ° and killed the ar-
mor-clad dragon Goliath using a child's toy. The David of Michelangelo is an 
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iconic image of the cool judgment and easy confidence of the Renaissance-the 
era that should have followed the Reformation and the leonine nay-saying stance 
ofLuther.61 
Although Nietzsche, from the vantage of critical history, has already 
sketched out the form of the transformations that he would like to see, we have 
noted that he is Moses and not David; this means that he speaks only as a "seer" 
of the future. Much of Zarathustra treats of the difficulty that Nietzsche, the 
diffident classicist, finds in adapting his message to the loud demotic tones of 
the Lion. The difficulty of this task is considerable: he has to convince an entire 
generation-the generation of WWI and the trenches-to go under or commit 
suicide. Like Moses the stammerer, he finds a priestly mouthpiece in Zarathus-
tra-a Nietzsche grown old and wise-who shatters the tablets of dualist morali-
ty62 and kindles the sacred fire of his people. It is in this persona that Nietzsche 
will play his part in the transition between Antiquarian and Monumental history. 
He will be bringing about the actual deeds of Monumental history, as we noted 
when discussing the life and myth of Achilles, these deeds are far uglier than the 
shining accounts of glorious feats that his posterity will see and be inspired by. 
This was why, with the exception of the Founder, Joshua, none of the lost gen-
eration of the Exodus could take his own memories of Moses, Egypt and Sinai 
into the Promised Land. 
The time finally comes for Zarathustra-Nietzsche to give affirmation to the 
voice of the Lion that he will successfully employ in his last works; he is com-
pelled to do so after a kind of Gethsemane scene where the old sage finally 
drains the chalice of violence to the lees as a toast to his shameless bride: Life. 63 
The age-old Homeric affinity between Ares and Aphrodite is used to transform 
the wild irrational Will of Schopenhauer into a prodigal feminine principle of 
life that he and his disciples will follow when they are pledged to "Be faithful to 
the Earth." More accurately however, the true subtext for this dalliance with 
life's vitality and violence is the virile humanism of Machiavelli's Prince. 
Dame Fortuna, Machiavelli's promiscuous replacement for Fate, both ap-
preciates and drains youthful virility; once a prince or poet has had his way with 
her, there is no guarantee that she will always be his muse and mistress. 64 He 
must prove his love for life repeatedly on what could only be called the slaugh-
ter-bed of Fortune. When an old woman advises Zarathustra: "You are going to 
woman? Don't forget the whip!"65 Nietzsche is clearly thinking of his Italian 
predecessor. The same claim could be made of his notorious claim that "Good 
and bad women all want a stick. "66 When Zarathustra is nauseated by the pros-
pect of the eternal return of the same, 67 it is because this has the same prodigal 
fertility of the Will to Life. Of course this principle of the eternal return suggests 
that the cyclical order of things is not entirely irrational or random; it is ruled by 
an evolving version of cyclical history in dialectical interaction with the Will as 
power. This Thucydidean force of ananke (necessity) whips Fortuna and directs 
her historical trajectory. Nietzsche finds that this human meaning to history is a 
less nauseating goal to command and preserve. 
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Now since the era of the Camel had barely ended in Nietzsche's own time, 
it was clear that the era of Critical history and philosophy was many generations 
away-beyond the trenches and holocausts of the bloody Twentieth Century. 
Yet, for all this, Nietzsche does address the philosophers of the future. Among 
other things, he does this to ensure that his master plan or outline of critical his-
tory will be available and understood, even if not necessarily followed, when the 
time finally comes for the philosopher-poet to take in hand the tiller of Zeus and 
guide the destiny of man. 
Post-Modernist philosophers have famously offered their accounts of a lib-
eral Nietzsche, basing their scholarship on some of our subject's more inflam-
matory writings-works written with the express intention of demolishing the 
strongest remnants of the culture of the past so that the badly over-due revalua-
tion of values could come about. If there is any doubt about Nietzsche's own 
expectations as to what a new and sustainable culture would look like, one only 
needs to turn to The Antichrist (AC), one of his last and most radical works, 
where he lays out an account of a tripartite political regime that still faithfully 
hews to the model set forth in Hesiod's Works and Days and Plato's Republic. 
In the Antichrist, Nietzsche lavishes high praise on the Law of Manu, say-
ing that "Here, the noble class: the philosophers and the warriors, stand above 
the mass."68 Nietzsche further states that "A law such as that of Manu ... sums 
up the experience, prudence and experimental morality of many centuries; it 
concludes: it creates nothing further. "69 By this he means that once the age of the 
Lion is over, the philosopher-founders establish a rigid new law code: "At acer-
tain point in the development of a people, the most circumspect stratum, that is, 
the one who sees furthest back and ahead, declares the experiment to be con-
cluded ... what must now be prevented above all is further experimentation, a 
continuation of a fluid state of values, testing, choosing, criticizing values ad 
infinitum." 70 
Nietzsche now goes on to explicitly endorse the tripartite model after first 
stating that an order of castes or rank is "the supreme and dominant law which is 
sanctioned by the natural order and naturally lawful, an institution over which 
no arbitrariness or modem idea possesses any authority."71 Every healthy society 
has "three types which condition each other and gravitate, differently, physio-
logically; each has its own hygiene, its own field of work ... Nature not man 
distinguishes the pre-eminently spiritual ones, those who are eminently strong in 
muscle and temperament and the mediocre ones; the last are the great majority, 
the first as the elite."72 
Those of the highest caste are said to "find their happiness where others 
would find their destruction: in labyrinths, in hardness against themselves and 
others, in experiments; their joy is self-conquest ... they rule not because they 
want to but because they are; they are not free to be second."73 Likewise the 
second class are "the guardians of the law, those who see to order and security, 
the noble warriors and above all the king as the highest formula of warrior, 
judge and upholder of the law." "Those of this class are the executive arm of the 
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most spiritual . . . that which does everything gross in the work of ruling for 
them, their retinue, their right hands, their best pupils."74 
Nietzsche finds nothing experimental or arbitrary about this: "The order of 
castes, the order of rank, merely formulate the highest law of life; the separation 
of the three types is necessary for the preservation of society, to make possible 
the higher and highest types."75 We cannot underestimate the privileges of the 
lower class; the artisans in the Republic had comforts (private property and 
family) that were not available to the higher classes. Life is harder as one climbs 
higher. Nietzsche compares culture to a pyramid, which must stand on the mass-
ive base of a "strong and solidly constructed mediocrity."76 
In all of this we can see how Nietzsche, philosopher and fervent enemy of 
nihilism, satisfies the masses' quest for substance and contentment (being-in-
itself) by separating, from the misguided or uneducated "being-for-itself' of the 
spirited class, what he had previously united with it to advance decadence. Here, 
he is but reiterating Aristotle's claim that man is a political animal, along with 
its corollary that those who can exist outside of a polity are either beasts or 
gods.77 But it is also worth noting that the classical polis did not interpose itself 
between man and world, but was an oikos for the soul; Hellenistic philosophy, 
which believed that man could be educated and the world improved, was not 
ruled by a rigid doctrine of types but held that the various elements of the soul 
could be led towards virtue by transcendental Eros and maieutic example. 
Even though Nietzsche's thought represents a great advance over Schopen-
hauer's pessimism, which only offer the diversion of art and music from an oth-
erwise bleak and cruel world, Nietzsche's basically hierarchic structures indicate 
the ultimately limited satisfaction that even the philosopher: "one who suffers 
and seeks deliverance," can gain from this world. While his exhortations to "Be 
faithful to the Earth" and "Give life a new human meaning" are of much value 
in liberating the human spirit from the death-grip of other-worldly abstractions 
and resentful pieties, his preference for violence in both speech and deed is a 
minimal advance over religious resignation. He ends up using the power-driven 
idiom of the optimistic Modems he despised -never ridding himself of the lega-
cy of de-Hellenized and Post-Nicean Christianity, belief in an omnipotent crea-
tor ex-nihilo. Also, since Nietzsche did not believe in the "enduring power" or 
integrity of the soul, Socrates' eponymous discovery, he deduced that any argu-
ment based on an appeal to truth is ultimately doomed to failure and disap-
pointment. Accordingly, he appeals to Caesar and says that a philosopher is 
strong enough to bear truths that break most hearts. 
Perhaps we should look to build further on Nietzsche's recognition that get-
ting rid of the true world also destroys the apparent by both acknowledging the 
fact that the Earth or purely physical world needs a superstructure of non-natural 
artifacts and intelligible objects (works of art, music, history and literature) and 
by also noting that this human meaning can be immortal and not historically 
conditioned propaganda-as Nietzsche may imply. While it may be fruitless to 
make rough love to Fortuna, sweet uses made of adversity in the past could out-
live their immediate horizon and bring lasting solace and joy to all who cultivate 
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their gardens: body and soul. Humanistic virtue of this kind is gained one soul at 
a time, but it makes it possible for anyone to see, and desire to share, a world of 
beauty they could expect all educated persons to participate in. This capacity 
gives us hope in humanity's ability to live in a commonwealth of true human 
meaning: one that faithfully realizes the promise of Earth's blind fertility. It also 
rejects that other infidelity to the Earth: the last man's vain hope to dwell forever 
in a technological utopia. 
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